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ABSTRACT 
We investigate the intrinsic motivation of individuals to report, and thereby sanction, 
fellow group members who lie for personal gain. We further explore the changes in lying 
and reporting behavior that result from giving individuals a say in who joins their group. 
We find that enough individuals are willing to report lies such that in fixed groups lying is 
unprofitable. However, we also find that when groups can select their members, 
individuals who report lies are generally shunned, even by groups where lying is absent. 
This facilitates the formation of dishonest groups where lying is prevalent and reporting is 
nonexistent. 
 
Date of this version: January 2013 
 
Keywords: lying; lying aversion; whistleblowing; social norms; dishonesty 




Note: This is the authors’ version of a work that was accepted for publication in the Journal of Economic Behavior 
& Organization. Changes resulting from the publishing process may not be reflected in this document. 
 1 
1. Introduction 
Reporting the deceptive behavior of others is an act that arouses conflicting opinions. 
Children are scolded for being “tattle-tales” and “snitch” is a common derogatory term. Yet 
this act can also be deemed praiseworthy, as in the case of whistleblowers or crime 
informants. In this paper, we study people’s intrinsic motives to report on others’ lies and 
evaluate the potential consequences. 
A growing body of research focuses on deception and the inclination of some people to 
tell the truth despite it being in their material interest to lie (Ellingsen and Johannesson, 
2004; Gneezy, 2005). For instance, Gibson et al. (in press) and Gneezy et al. (2013) 
demonstrate that individuals are averse to lying (to varying degrees) but can be tempted to 
lie when doing so is profitable enough.1 We extend the literature on lying aversion by 
studying the willingness to uphold truth telling by punishing and disassociating oneself 
from people who lie. 
We run a laboratory experiment in which subjects play a repeated “whistleblowing” 
game. In each repetition of the game, subjects draw a random number that corresponds to 
their “true” earnings. Subsequently, they have the opportunity to overstate their earnings, 
which increases their payoff. Importantly, subjects are divided into groups within which 
they can observe each other’s true and stated earnings. If lying occurs, subjects have the 
opportunity to report their group and thereby sanction lying subjects. Reporting others 
does not bestow monetary benefits. This game mimics situations where lying is individually 
profitable but heavily sanctioned by a central authority that relies on individuals within the 
organization to report it—e.g., because monitoring is prohibitively expensive. 
Some evidence suggests that people do sanction those who tell them lies (Brandts and 
Charness, 2003; Croson et al., 2003; Sánchez-Pagés and Vorsatz, 2007, 2009; Eisenkopf et 
al., 2011; Angelova and Regner, 2013). However, in these studies, lies are to the detriment 
                                                             
1 Other experimental studies on lying include Charness and Dufwenberg (2006, 2010), Cai and Wang (2006), 
Fischbacher and Heusi (2008), Vanberg (2008), Hurkens and Kartik (2009), Lundquist et al. (2009), Sutter 
(2009), Rode (2010), López-Pérez and Spiegelman (2012), Erat and Gneezy (in press), and Jiang (2013). 
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of the people being lied to and therefore, lying also conveys an intention to hurt the person 
that is subsequently making the decision to punish. In this study, we test the willingness to 
punish liars even when lies do not affect the pecuniary interest of, and are not directed at, 
potential punishers. If punishment occurs in this setting, it indicates that individuals 
consider lying per se as behavior that deserves to be sanctioned. 
We also evaluate the consequences of reporting lies. One can reasonably expect that 
people welcome those who sanction liars. However, empirical evidence indicates that this is 
not necessarily the case. Dyck et al. (2010) demonstrate that the career prospects of 
employees who report corporate malfeasance are so dismal that it is surprising that people 
whistleblow at all. Similarly, strong community norms against reporting others—
epitomized by the phrase “snitches get stitches”—have been documented by journalists and 
academics (Brown, 2007; Kahn, 2007). These reports point to fear of ostracism and 
punishment by their peers as a major reason why people do not report others’ wrongdoings 
(Whitman and Davis, 2007). We incorporate such peer effects into the experiment by giving 
subjects a say in who joins their group. Specifically, occasionally, subjects are randomly 
removed from their group, and for them to rejoin a group, they must be unanimously 
accepted by the group’s current members. Group members are informed of displaced 
subjects’ past behavior, allowing us to determine whether subjects avoid or welcome people 
who report lies. Crucially, to determine the importance of these effects in the overall 
amount of lying and reporting, we run another treatment without voting where displaced 
subjects rejoin groups at random. 
Field research that explores the causes and motivations to report lies faces a complex 
task due to extrinsic incentives and selection effects (Bowen et al, 2010; Schmidt, 2005). By 
comparison, our experimental setting is ideal to control these selection effects and to isolate 
the intrinsic motivations to report lies.  
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2. Experimental design and procedures 
2.1. The whistleblowing game 
For simplicity, we describe the whistleblowing game with the parameters used in the 
experiment. Consider a “society” composed of  = 1, … ,12 individuals and  = 1, … ,3 
organizations. Each organization  is staffed by 	
 ∈ 2,3 individuals. The game is played 
repeatedly for nine periods and each period is divided into two stages. In the first stage, 
each individual observes her “true” earnings  , which are independently drawn from a 
uniform distribution with support 0, 
 where 
  are the maximum earnings in ’s 
organization . The value of 
  increases with the size of the organization: 
 = 300 
points for organizations of 	
 = 3 and 
 = 225 points for organizations of 	
 = 2. After 
observing  , each individual simultaneously decides on the earnings she wishes to state  . 
Individuals are free to state any feasible earnings  ∈ 0, 
. Barring any sanctions, an 
individual’s payoff equals her stated earnings and not her true earnings. In the second stage, 
individuals observe both the true and stated earnings of everyone in their organization and 
simultaneously decide whether they wish to report their organization. If at least one 
individual reports, the organization is inspected and all individuals who overstated their 
earnings (chose  > ) are sanctioned by three times the overstated amount.2 Hence, the 
payoff of individual  of organization  in a period equals: 
 =  − 3 −  if  is inspected and  >  otherwise . 
At the end of the second stage, individuals are informed of the payoff and actions of all 
individuals in their organization. 
Next, we describe how organizational membership is determined. At the beginning of the 
game, all individuals in the society are randomly assigned to one of the three organizations. 
However, after periods 3 and 6 one individual in each organization of 	
 = 3 is randomly 
separated from her organization.3 Before play resumes, everyone in the society observes 
                                                             
2 By design, reporting was not possible in fully truthful organizations. 
3 To avoid organizations form disappearing, organizations of 	
 = 2 do not lose members. 
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the following information of each separated individual: (i) their mean stated earnings over 
the last three periods, (ii) whether they reported their organization in the last three periods, 
and (iii) whether they were sanctioned for overstating their earnings in the last three 
periods. We implement two treatments. In Random, all separated individuals are randomly 
reassigned to organizations. By contrast, in Selection, separated individuals must be 
accepted into organizations by a unanimous vote. Specifically, individuals indicate whether 
they accept or veto each separated individual. Thereafter, separated individuals are 
randomly assigned among the organizations that unanimously accepted them. If no such 
organization exists, the individual remains separated for three periods during which she 
does not receive or state earnings and obtains a payoff of  = 0 points. Meanwhile, 
organizations of 	
 = 2 play with reduced maximum earnings of 
 = 225 points. 
The experiment was conducted using standard procedures of anonymity, neutrally 
worded instructions, and monetary incentives (all periods were paid). We employed a 
between-subjects treatment design with eight independent observations (societies) per 
treatment. The appendix contains the precise experimental procedures.  
2.2. Theoretical predictions 
We briefly discuss the theoretical predictions. If all individuals are risk neutral and own-
earnings maximizers then, in both treatments, everyone states the maximum earnings and 
nobody reports others.4 Moreover, in Selection, all separated individuals are accepted 
because organizations of 	
 = 3 generate higher stated earnings than those of 	
 = 2.5  
We next discuss how predictions change if some individuals incur disutility from lying. 
By assumption, models of lying aversion predict less overstating as some individuals state 
their earnings truthfully. None of these models, however, propose motivations for 
individuals to report others for overstating. We provide an informal discussion assuming 
that, in addition to individuals who incur disutility when they lie, there are indignant 
                                                             
4 Reporting carries the opportunity cost of lying since all who overstate, including the reporter, are sanctioned. 
5 All voting strategies that lead to all organizations having three players are equilibria. However, accepting all 
separated individuals weakly dominates other voting strategies, making it the safer option. 
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individuals who incur a utility loss when they or others in their organization lie, but whose 
utility loss is smaller if liars are sanctioned.6 In Random, indignant individuals ought to 
reduce or even eliminate lying behavior. In Selection, this might not occur because 
indignant individuals can be avoided by forming dishonest organizations. Specifically, an 
individual who only maximizes her earnings is better off in an organization of 	
 = 2 where 
the probability of being reported is low than in one of 	
 = 3 where the probability of being 
reported is high,7 in which case it is optimal for her to veto those who reported others in the 
past. Note that individuals who report might be vetoed even by individuals who incur 
disutility when they lie because they understand that they might be tempted to lie when the 
benefits of lying are considerable. If reporting sufficiently increases the probability of being 
vetoed, it is possible that indignant individuals will stop reporting altogether. 
3. Results 
We test the statistical significance of our findings using regressions with standard errors 
clustered on societies (all p-values correspond to two-tailed tests). Moreover, unless it is 
otherwise noted, we include subject random effects. Table 1 shows the mean and standard 
deviation per period for the key variables. The appendix contains additional statistical 
analyses, including treatment comparisons using non-parametric tests, an analysis of the 
effects of organization size, and additional descriptive statistics. 
3.1. Overstating 
Figure 1 describes overstating behavior. The left panel shows the distribution of the 
amount overstated per period as a fraction of the maximum overstatement. In a given 
period, the modal choice is honesty. However, overstatements occur regularly and are 
                                                             
6 Certainly, other motivations for reporting overstatements can exist. For example, reporting could be motivated 
by lying averse individuals who dislike inequality (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) or enjoy earning more than others 
(Frank, 1985). In the appendix, we show that these motivations are not key predictors of reporting behavior. 
7 Specifically, if ./	
0 is the probability that at least one other individual in the organization reports, then it is 
optimal to veto others and overstate maximally when ./	
 = 30 > 1 3⁄  (so that dishonesty does not pay in 
	
 = 3) and ./	
 = 20 < 2 9⁄  (so that dishonesty pays more in 	
 = 2 than honesty in 	
 = 3). 
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usually maximal, i.e.  = 
 . The right panel shows the amount overstated per subject 
over all periods as a fraction of their maximum overstatement. Most subjects overstate, but 
they do not do so maximally in all periods.  
We see in Table 1 that the fraction of points overstated in Random is considerably lower 
than in Selection. A Tobit regression (censoring at 1 and 0) with a treatment dummy 
variable confirms that this difference is statistically significant (4 = 0.016). In the appendix, 
we analyze the determinants of overstating. We find that overstating is more likely if the 
gain from lying is large and subjects observe or experience unpunished lying in the past 
(similar results are reported by Gino et al., 2009; Fosgaard et al., 2013). 
Result 1 (Overstating earnings): Subjects regularly overstate their earnings, albeit, most do 
not do so maximally. The option to select who enters their organization facilitates overstating.  
Table 1 – Descriptive statistics 
Treatment Random Selection 
Organization size 	
 = 3 	
 = 2 	
 = 3 Both 
Points overstated  −  29.7 54.7 66.2 63.1 
 (69.3) (71.2) (96.4) (90.5) 
Fraction of points overstated  −  /
 − 0⁄  19.6 51.1 41.1 43.8 
 (36.2) (48.8) (46.8) (47.6) 
Fraction reporting 16.9 4.9 13.4 11.1 
 (37.5) (21.6) (34.1) (31.5) 
Fraction reporting conditional on others overstating 31.6 8.7 19.2 16.8 
 (46.5) (28.3) (39.4) (37.4) 
Fraction sanctioned 19.2 5.4 15.2 12.6 
 (39.4) (22.6) (36.0) (33.2) 
Fraction sanctioned conditional on overstating 55.7 9.6 29.3 23.7 
 (49.8) (29.5) (45.6) (42.6) 
Final payoff 129.0 161.2 146.3 132.5 
 (153.7) (90.5) (192.3) (167.9) 
Note: All fractions are in percent. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. Of the 32 organizations in 
Selection, after the third period 17 are of size 	
 = 2 and 15 of 	
 = 3.  
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3.2. Reporting others 
Table 1 shows that, conditional on witnessing at least one overstatement, subjects report 
overstatements 32 percent of the time in Random and 17 percent of the time in Selection 
(4 = 0.028 with a logit regression). We see an even larger difference in the fraction of 
overstatements that are sanctioned: 56 percent in Random vs. only 24 percent in Selection 
(4 = 0.006 with a logit regression). 
In the appendix, we analyze the motivations to report overstatements. We find that 
observing others overstate when one has not overstated is the most important determinant 
of reporting. Interestingly, if we control for having overstated then there are no longer 
treatment differences in reporting (illustrated in Figure 2). This is consistent with the 
presence of indignant individuals who sanction liars but have fewer opportunities to do so 
in Selection. 
Result 2 (Reporting overstatements): In the absence of selection, enough subjects report 
others so that most overstatements are sanctioned. If organizations can select their members, 
reporting is less frequent and overstatements are sanctioned less often.  
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3.3. Organization member selection 
We first analyze how subjects decide whom to accept into their organization. To do so, 
we run logit regressions with a dependent variable that equals one if subject  vetoes 
separated subject 7 and zero otherwise. In the first, the independent variables are: (i) a 
dummy variable equal to one if 7 was sanctioned for overstating; (ii) 7’s mean stated 
earnings; and (iii) a dummy variable equal to one if 7 reported others for overstating. In the 
second, these variables are interacted with three dummy variables that indicate whether:  
never overstated,  sometimes overstated, or  always overstated. We use subject and period 
fixed effects. Table 2 displays the results. 
We find that the odds of being vetoed by  significantly increase if 7 reported others. This 
effect is to be expected if  overstated. Interestingly, the effect is also significant if  never 
overstated. Additionally, we find that the higher 7’s stated earnings, and hence the 
probability that 7 overstated, the higher the chance of acceptance by . Finally, we do not see 
a significant effect of having being sanctioned. 
Figure 2 – Reporting conditioning on having overstated 
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We next evaluate the impact of selection on organizational composition. Figure 3 
presents evidence that the selection process creates highly dishonest organizations. The 
bars plot the distribution of organizations according to number of overstatements in a 
three-period interval (for intervals after selection has taken place: periods 4-6 and 7-9). As 
a benchmark that controls for the different propensities to overstate depending on the 
treatment and organization size, the lines plot the mean distribution that results if we 
randomly reassign subjects to organizations keeping constant their treatment, organization 
size, and overstatement behavior.8 For a given three-period interval, only 3 percent of 
organizations are fully dishonest in Random. By contrast, in Selection, fully dishonest 
organizations correspond to 20 (41) percent of organizations of 	
 = 3 (	
 = 2). This is 
well below the fraction that emerges by randomly recreating organizations: 4 (22) percent 
for 	
 = 3 (	
 = 2), which illustrates the importance of selection and peer effects to 
sustaining highly dishonest organizations. 
                                                             
8 Distributions are based on 50,000 draws. 
Table 2 – Determinants of vetoing 
 Specification I Specification II 
Independent variables o.r. s.e. o.r. s.e. 
7 was sanctioned 1.19 (0.26)   
7’s stated earnings 0.51*** (0.13)   
7 reported others 2.47*** (0.40)   
 never overstated × 7 was sanctioned   1.25 (0.19) 
 never overstated × 7’s stated earnings   0.61** (0.14) 
 never overstated × 7 reported others   2.15*** (0.50) 
 sometimes overstated ×  7 was sanctioned   1.37 (0.48) 
 sometimes overstated × 7’s  stated earnings   0.61** (0.15) 
 sometimes overstated × 7 reported others   3.11** (1.72) 
 always overstated × 7 was sanctioned   0.99 (0.48) 
 always overstated × 7’s stated earnings   0.38*** (0.13) 
 always overstated × 7 reported others   2.82*** (0.73) 
Period fixed effects Yes Yes 
Subject fixed effects Yes Yes 
Pseudo 89  0.17 0.19 
# of obs./subj./societies 464/68/8 464/68/8 
Note: Significant at 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**),10 percent (*). 
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Result 3 (Acceptance into organizations): Subjects who reported others have difficulties 
rejoining organizations as they are vetoed by those who overstate and those who do not. By 
contrast, subjects with high stated earnings, which suggest that they overstated, are 
welcomed. This selection process leads to the formation of highly dishonest organizations. 
3.4. Final payoffs, overstating, and reporting 
Figure 4 plots the relationship between the subjects’ payoff over all nine periods and the 
fraction of times subjects overstate (left) or report others (right), both in terciles. In 
Random, we see that the tercile of subjects who overstate most have lower payoffs than the 
rest. By contrast, in Selection, the converse is true. We also see that reporting others has no 
perceivable effect on payoffs in Random, but it has a strong negative effect in Selection. To 
test whether these relations are statistically significant, we regress the subjects’ payoff on 
the fraction of times each subject overstated or reported others. We use GLS regressions 
with society fixed effects. In Random, we obtain a significantly negative coefficient for the 
fraction of overstatements (: = −67 points, 4 = 0.012) and a positive but not significant 
coefficient for the fraction of reports (: = 28 points, 4 = 0.519). By contrast, in Selection 
the coefficient for fraction of overstatements is significantly positive (: = 59 points, 
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4 = 0.010) and the coefficient for the fraction of reports is negative and weakly significant 
(: = −76 points, 4 = 0.081). 
Result 4 (Final payoffs): In the absence of selection, dishonest subjects have lower payoffs 
than honest subjects. However, if organizations can select their members, the converse is true. 
Lastly, with selection, the lowest payoff is obtained by subjects who report others for 
overstating. 
4. Conclusions 
We study whether individuals are willing to sanction people who lie for personal gain by 
reporting them to a central authority. We find that, in randomly assigned groups, enough 
people are willing to report lying to make lying unprofitable. We also investigate how the 
frequency of lying and reporting lies is affected when individuals can select who joins their 
group. Our results indicate that this type of selection is already enough to increase the 
frequency of lying and decrease the amount of reporting by facilitating the formation of a 
significant number of dishonest groups in which lying is prevalent and reporting is 
nonexistent. 
Figure 4 – Final payoff depending on the amount of overstating and reporting 
 








































The fact that some individuals report others for lying, even when lies are not directed 
toward them and cause no obvious harm, suggests that they consider lying per se as 
normatively undesirable behavior that deserves to be punished. This fact calls for models 
that assume that lying violates a social norm that is followed and enforced depending on the 
expectations of others (e.g., López-Pérez, 2012; Battigalli et al., 2013) and is not simply an 
individual cost.9 
Our work also highlights the fact that people who report others for being dishonest are 
not always well received or sought after, even by individuals who act honestly. This is an 
important finding because it implies that reporting dishonest actions is very costly, as 
reporters can be ostracized even from truthful organizations. This helps explain the dismal 
careers of employees who are whistleblowers (Dyck et al., 2010) and calls for caution when 
it comes to policies that reveal their identity. As discussed, avoiding those who report is 
consistent with lying averse individuals who are generally honest but understand that they 
might be tempted to lie. Alternatively, reporters might be shunned because they are disliked 
for being “holier than thou” types (for support of this idea, see Parks and Stone, 2010). 
Further research using variations of our game can be used to differentiate between these 
two explanations. 
As in most experimental studies, our study abstracts away from many elements of real 
life in order to cleanly identify specific effects and motivations. However, the 
whistleblowing game can be easily modified to evaluate the effect of different intrinsic and 
extrinsic incentives to tell and report lies. For instance, it is interesting to evaluate the effect 
of individuals being able to exit or be fired from their organization. In this case, honest 
individuals might prefer to leave instead of reporting others, or be fired before they have a 
chance to do so, which would lead to more dishonesty. Similarly, it would be fascinating to 
test whether extrinsic costs and benefits of reporting affect how reporters are perceived by 
others. If reporting is costly, it ought to be perceived as more altruistic, which might help 
the career prospects of reporters. By contrast, if reporting is beneficial then it becomes a 
                                                             
9 Evidence of the importance of context on the propensity to deceive others can be found in Belot and Schröder 
(2013), Cappelen et al. (2013), Gravert (2013), Jiang (2013),.and Kriss et al. (2013). 
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weaker signal of altruism, which could lead to increased shunning (see Bénabou and Tirole, 
2006). This type of research can potentially inform policies such as the granting of 
immunity to whistleblowers or rewarding them through qui tam statutes.  
References 
Angelova, V., Regner, T., 2013. Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial 
advice? An experimental deception game. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.  
Battigalli, P., Charness, C., Dufwenberg, M., 2013. Deception: The role of guilt. Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization. 
Belot, M., Schröder, M., 2013. Sloppy work, lies and theft: A novel experimental design to study 
counterproductive behaviour. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.  
Bénabou, R., Tirole, J., 2006. Incentives and Prosocial Behavior. American Economic Review 96, 1652-
1678. 
Bowen, R.M., Call, A.C., Rajgopal, S., 2010. Whistle-blowing: Target firm characteristics and economic 
consequences. The Accounting Review 85: 1239-1271. 
Brandts, J., Charness, G., 2003. Truth or consequences: An experiment. Management Science 49: 116-
130. 
Brown, E., 2007. Snitch: Informants, Cooperators, and the Corruption of Justice. New York: Public 
Affairs Press. 
Cai, H., Wang, J. T.-Y., 2006. Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games. Games 
and Economic Behavior 56: 7-36. 
Cappelen, A.W., Sørensen, E.Ø., Tungodden, B., 2013. When do we lie? Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization. 
Charness, G., Dufwenberg, M., 2006. Promises and partnership. Econometrica 74: 1579-1601. 
Charness, G., Dufwenberg, M., 2010. Bare promises: An experiment. Economics Letters 107: 281-283. 
Croson, R., Boles, T., Murnighan, K., 2003. Cheap talk in bargaining experiments: Lying and threats in 
ultimatum games. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 51: 143-159. 
Dyck, A., Morse, A., Zingales, L., 2010. Who blows the whistle on corporate fraud? The Journal of 
Finance 65: 2213-2253. 
Eisenkopf, G., Gurtoviy, R., Utikal, V., 2011. Size matters—When it comes to lies. Working paper, 
University of Konstanz. 
 14 
Ellingsen, T., Johannesson, M., 2004. Promises, threats, and fairness. The Economic Journal 114: 397-
420. 
Erat, S., Gneezy, U., in press. White lies. Management Science 58: 723-733. 
Fehr, E., Schmidt, K., 1999. A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 114: 817-868. 
Fischbacher, U., Heusi, F., 2008. Lies in disguise. An experimental study on cheating. TWI Research 
Paper Series, Universität Konstanz. 
Fosgaard, T., Hansen, L.G., Piovesan, M., 2013. Separating will from grace: An experiment on 
conformity and awareness in cheating. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.  
Frank, R.H., 1985. Choosing the right pond: Human behavior and the quest for status. Oxford  
University  Press,  New York. 
Gibson, R., Tanner, C., Wagner, A., in press. Preferences for truthfulness: Heterogeneity among and 
within individuals. American Economic Review. 
Gino, F., Ayal, S., Ariely, D., 2009. Contagion and differentiation in unethical behavior: The effect of 
one bad apple on the barrel. Psychological Science 20: 393-398.  
Gneezy, U., 2005. Deception: The role of consequences. American Economic Review 95: 384-394. 
Gneezy, U., Rockenbach, B., Serra-Garcia, M., 2013. Measuring lying aversion. Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization. 
Gravert, C., 2013. How luck and performance affect stealing. Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization.  
Hurkens, S., Kartik, N., 2009. Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion. 
Experimental Economics 12: 180-192. 
Jiang, T., 2013. Cheating in mind games: The subtlety of rules matters. Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization.  
Kahn, J., 2007. The story of a snitch. The Atlantic Monthly 80: 86-88. 
Kriss, P.H., Nagel, R., Weber, R.A., 2013. Implicit vs. explicit deception in ultimatum games with 
incomplete information. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.  
López-Pérez, R., 2012. The power of words: A model of honesty and fairness. Journal of Economic 
Psychology 33: 642-658. 
López-Pérez, R., Spiegelman, E., 2012. Do economists lie more? Working paper, Universidad 
Autónoma de Madrid. 
 15 
Lundquist, T., Ellingsen, T., Gribbe, E., Johannesson, M., 2009. The aversion to lying. Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization 70: 81-92.   
Parks, C.D., Stone, A.B., 2010. The desire to expel unselfish members from the group. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 99: 303-310. 
Rode, J., 2010. Truth and trust in communication: Experiments on the effect of a competitive context. 
Games and Economic Behavior 68: 325-338. 
Sánchez-Pagés, S., Vorsatz, M., 2007. An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender-receiver 
game. Games and Economic Behavior 61: 86-112. 
Sánchez-Pagés, S., Vorsatz, M., 2009. Enjoy the silence: An experiment on truth-telling. Experimental 
Economics 12: 220-241. 
Schmidt, M., 2005. “Whistle blowing” regulation and accounting standards enforcement in Germany 
and Europe—An economic perspective. International Review of Law and Economics 25: 143-168. 
Sutter, M., 2009. Deception through telling the truth?! Experimental evidence from individuals and 
teams. The Economic Journal 119: 47-60. 
 Vanberg, C., 2008. Why do people keep their promises? An experimental test of two explanations. 
Econometrica 76: 1467-1480. 
Whitman, J.L., Davis, R.C., 2007. Snitches get stitches: Youth, gangs and witness intimidation in 
Massachusetts. National Center for Victims of Crime, Washington, D.C. 
 
